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Law, Power, and “Rumors of War”:  
Robert Jackson Confronts Law and Security 
After Nuremberg 
MARY L. DUDZIAK† 
INTRODUCTION 
When Robert Jackson traveled to Buffalo in October 
1946, he stood on the threshold of a new era. In his 
centennial speech, Jackson took account of a war era the 
world was just emerging from. The horrors of World War II, 
he hoped, reshaped the world in a way that would lessen 
such devastating conflict and destruction. Until this time, 
collective efforts had not been able to hold back war. But 
Nuremberg changed this, he hoped. Its long-range 
significance lay in “the effort to demonstrate or to establish 
the supremacy of law over such lawless and catastrophic 
forces as war and persecutions.”1 From Nuremberg might 
come “legal controls of these disastrous forces.”2 But only 
the coming years would show whether the efforts at 
Nuremberg were “but a flash of light in an otherwise dark 
century, or . . . the harbinger of a dawn.”3 
Even as Jackson urged that human action, through law, 
could hold back the forces of warfare, he warned of a 
different future. “If the East and the West cannot or will not 
  
† Judge Edward J. and Ruey L. Professor of Law, History and Political Science, 
University of Southern California Gould School of Law. Many thanks to Alfred 
Konefsky, Dianne Avery, Mateo Taussig-Rubbo, and others on the SUNY 
Buffalo Law School faculty for their helpful comments on this Essay and on my 
broader work on wartime. Thanks to Julia Wood, Habeeb Syed, and Sam Petty 
for their essential help with research, to Marguerite Most of the Duke Law 
Library, and to the Buffalo Law Review staff.  
 1. Robert H. Jackson, Address at the University of Buffalo Centennial 
Convocation, October 4, 1946, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 283, 287 (2012). 
 2. Id.  
 3. Id. at 293. 
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bridge the gaps in interest and method and political 
viewpoint now evident and so often overdramatized, it may 
be that the good effects of this drawing together in 
jurisprudential principles and procedures will be 
dissipated.”4 But they had worked so hard to overcome 
national differences at Nuremberg. He simply found it 
“difficult to believe that we will not be able to live together 
without sacrificing either the peace or fundamental 
interests.”5 
My task in this Essay is to set Jackson in the world he 
occupied when he returned from Nuremberg, and to follow 
him as that world fell apart. In Nuremberg, Jackson and his 
colleagues took what war had wrought, and they fashioned 
legal tools that they hoped would lessen war itself. In this 
effort, Jackson changed law that applied to warfare. In 
looking to the future, he seems to have assumed that 
although law had changed, war would retain its essential 
character. Yet as the post-war years became instead the 
Cold War years, Jackson found himself in an era when the 
boundaries around wartime were eroding.6 The world 
entered an ambiguous era that seemed to be neither war 
nor peace. During such an era, how did Jackson think about 
war? What sort of war era did he think the nation was 
facing, and how should it affect rights and government 
power at home?  
A set of ideas about war and peace were held by the 
World War II generation. Wartime and peacetime were 
thought to be, more or less, distinct states. People could tell 
when they were in a wartime—after all, Congress would 
declare it. Wartime was always followed by peacetime, and 
this meant that wars were, by definition, temporary. Rights 
were sometimes compromised in wartimes, and presidents 
overstepped the limits to their power, but since wartimes 
were temporary, that would eventually go away.7 
  
 4. Id.  
 5. Id. 
 6. See MARY L. DUDZIAK, WAR·TIME: AN IDEA, ITS HISTORY, ITS 
CONSEQUENCES 61-94 (2012).  
 7. See id. at 11-32. 
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This basic structure to thinking about wartime still 
lurks in American jurisprudence, even in the age of drone 
warfare.8 But there was a moment when this way of 
thinking seemed to collapse, when the concept of peacetime 
dissolved. As Jackson himself would put it when he 
returned to Buffalo to deliver the inaugural James 
McCormick Mitchell Lecture in 1951, rather than a break 
between wartime and peacetime, there was instead “a 
prolonged period of international tension and rumors of 
war, with war itself as the ever threatening alternative.”9 
Could Jackson‟s vision of peace through law and legal 
institutions hold during a Cold War? 
I. POSTWAR BECOMES COLD WAR 
Before the Nuremberg tribunal heard its first witness, 
writers on both sides of the Atlantic took stock of a world 
reshaped by the advent of nuclear weapons. In the fall of 
1945, George Orwell wrote that the bomb was likely to 
change the structure of global politics. Weak states would 
become weaker, and “two or three monstrous super-states,” 
each with nuclear weapons, would “divid[e] the world 
between them.”10 These monster states would not use the 
bomb against each other. Instead, each state might be 
“unconquerable and in a permanent state of „cold war‟ with 
its neighbours.”11 The nuclear age would be, therefore, a 
“cold war” era, in which the world would see “an end to 
large-scale wars at the cost of prolonging indefinitely „a 
peace that is no peace‟.”12  
  
 8. See id. at 95-132. 
 9. Robert H. Jackson, Wartime Security and Liberty Under Law, 1 BUFF. L. 
REV. 103, 104 (1951).  
 10. George Orwell, You and the Atomic Bomb, TRIBUNE (London), Oct. 19, 
1945, reprinted in 4 THE COLLECTED ESSAYS, JOURNALISM AND LETTERS OF 
GEORGE ORWELL: IN FRONT OF YOUR NOSE, 1946-1950, at 6, 8 (Sonia Orwell & 
Ian Angus eds., 1968).   
 11. Id. at 9. 
 12. Id. at 10. 
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The idea of a “cold war” was, of course, intentionally 
contradictory, suggesting an era of war-but-not-war.13 But 
international tensions soon escalated. In March 1946, while 
the Nuremberg trial was in session, Winston Churchill 
warned that “an iron curtain has descended across the 
Continent” of Europe.14 This was “a solemn moment” as the 
United States, “at the pinnacle of world power,” shouldered 
“an awe-inspiring accountability to the future.”15 For 
Churchill, Soviet power and aggression would not be reined 
in by international law. They could only be met with 
American strength and solidarity with Western Europe.16 
The anxieties of the nuclear age were manifested in 
post-World War II national security politics. Historian 
Michael Hogan argues that Cold War struggles over 
American policy and the nature of the state were about 
more than combating communism. Also at stake was 
American national identity, the nation‟s role in the world, 
and the impact of Cold War policies on domestic 
institutions.17       
After World War II, Americans hoped for a return to 
peacetime concerns. Initially, American leaders were 
divided in their perceptions of the world conditions that the 
nation confronted. In battles over the budget and military 
policy, some policymakers viewed the idea of distinctions 
between war and peace to be a “technicality” outmoded in a 
new era “when the United States had to be prepared for war 
  
 13. The term was popularized by Walter Lippman and Bernard Baruch, and 
entered American political discourse in 1947. See Bernard Baruch, Text of 
Bernard Baruch’s Address at Portrait Unveiling, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1947, at 
21; Walter Lippmann, Today and Tomorrow, The Cold War: Study of U.S. 
Policy, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 1947, at 11; WALTER LIPPMANN, THE COLD WAR: A 
STUDY IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (1947). 
 14. Winston S. Churchill, The Sinews of Peace, Address at Westminster 
College in Fulton, Missouri (Mar. 5, 1946), in 7 WINSTON S. CHURCHILL: HIS 
COMPLETE SPEECHES, 1897-1963, at 7285, 7290 (Robert Rhodes James ed., 1974). 
 15. Id. at 7286. 
 16. Id. at 7285-93. 
 17. MICHAEL J. HOGAN, A CROSS OF IRON: HARRY S. TRUMAN AND THE ORIGINS 
OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE, 1945-1954, at 24 (1998). 
2012] LAW, POWER, AND "RUMORS OF WAR" 371 
on a permanent basis.”18 “The central challenge of state-
making in the early Cold War,” Hogan argues, “was to 
prepare for permanent struggle without surrendering 
constitutional principles and democratic traditions to the 
garrison state.”19   
President Harry S. Truman initially tried to maintain 
the idea of a peacetime world, insisting that his policies 
were not “mobilization for war,” but instead 
“preparedness.”20 But Truman himself encouraged war 
hysteria to generate support for foreign aid in his “Truman 
Doctrine” speech in March 1947.21 Framing the Cold War as 
an epic struggle, Truman warned that “[a]t the present 
moment in world history nearly every nation must choose 
between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not 
a free one.”22 Truman contrasted a “way of life [ ] . . . based 
upon the will of the majority, and . . . distinguished by free 
institutions, . . . freedom of speech and religion, and 
freedom from political oppression,” and a “second way of 
life” that “relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled 
press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of 
personal freedoms.”23  
To safeguard American liberty and freedom, Truman 
insisted that the United States must support free peoples 
who were resisting communism around the world, so the 
Truman Doctrine was about the projection of American 
power, not about maintaining peace through international 
institutions.24 The following year would seem darker, with a 
coup in Czechoslovakia, the ouster of non-communist 
members of its government, and the Soviet blockade of West 
  
 18. Id. at 215. 
 19. Id. at 234. 
 20. Id. at 217. 
 21. Id. at 15. 
 22. President Harry S. Truman, Special Message to the Congress on Greece 
and Turkey, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress, 1947 PUB. PAPERS 176, 
178 (Mar. 12, 1947). 
 23. Id. 
 24. See id. at 179-80; CAMPBELL CRAIG & FREDRIK LOGEVALL, AMERICA‟S COLD 
WAR: THE POLITICS OF INSECURITY 76-82 (2009). 
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Berlin, geared toward driving American, French, and 
British troops from the city.25 Then, in August 1949, the 
Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb. In October of 
that year, China “fell” to the Communists, as Mao Zedong‟s 
troops prevailed in a civil war.26 In June 1950, North Korean 
forces, allied with the Soviets and China, invaded South 
Korea with the goal of reunifying the divided country. 
Within days, President Truman committed American forces 
to a United Nations action in support of South Korea.27 As 
events seemed to propel the world closer to the brink, 
American leaders crafted a Cold War strategy premised on 
the idea that projecting American military power around 
the world was the best means of safeguarding American 
security. NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs 
for National Security would remain secret during Jackson‟s 
lifetime, but it became central to American national security 
policy.28 Its vision was that the only protection against an 
aggressive Soviet Union was to project American power and 
extend American military engagement. If international law 
might restrain aggression, it was at least a distant second to 
power—economic and military. 
At home, Cold War anxieties filtered into domestic 
politics. In February 1950, Senator Joseph McCarthy falsely 
claimed that he had a list of 205 communists employed in 
the State Department. McCarthy had been looking for a 
campaign issue.29 He would not be alone in “red-baiting,” as 
politicians quickly learned that campaigning against 
communism was an effective way to run for office.30 
  
 25. CRAIG & LOGEVALL, supra note 24, at 91-95. 
 26. Id. at 102. 
 27. Id. at 114-18. 
 28. NAT‟L SECURITY COUNCIL, NSC-68: A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
COUNCIL BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ON UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND 
PROGRAMS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY (Apr. 14, 1950), reprinted in U.S. DEP‟T OF 
STATE, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1950 NATIONAL SECURITY 
AFFAIRS, FOREIGN AND ECONOMIC POLICY 234, 234-92 (1974);  see also CRAIG & 
LOGEVALL, supra note 24, at 127-38. 
 29. ELLEN SCHRECKER, MANY ARE THE CRIMES: MCCARTHYISM IN AMERICA 241 
(1998); CRAIG & LOGEVALL, supra note 24, at 123-24. 
 30. See STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: 
A HISTORY 431-33 (2008). 
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Meanwhile, Hogan writes, national security “became the 
common currency of most policy makers, the arbiter of most 
values, the key to America‟s new identity.”31 In American 
national security ideology, “the distinction between war and 
peace had disappeared,” as the government transitioned 
into a National Security state.32 
II. JUSTICE JACKSON‟S COLD WAR 
A. The Communist Threat 
These global tensions troubled Robert Jackson as he 
resumed his role as a Supreme Court Justice, and they 
challenged his vision of peace through law. In the spring of 
1947, the specter of imminent war did not worry him, but 
instead the spread of totalitarianism, which left the world 
“more fear-ridden” than it was “at the close of a war to give 
freedom from fear.”33 In World War II-related cases, he had 
counseled against wholesale abrogation of rights because of 
security concerns. In Cramer v. United States, which 
overturned, on the basis of insufficient evidence, a 
conviction for treason of a man charged with helping two 
German saboteurs, Jackson quoted Thomas Paine: “He that 
would make his own liberty secure must guard even his 
enemy from oppression.”34 Jackson dissented in Korematsu 
v. United States, arguing that the Court should not ratify 
the internment of Japanese Americans during the war.35  
One of Jackson‟s most celebrated Supreme Court 
opinions on individual rights and war was West Virginia 
Board of Education v. Barnette in 1943.36 The Court held 
  
 31. HOGAN, supra note 17, at 313. 
 32. Id. at 209, 300, 313. 
 33. Robert H. Jackson, Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the U.S., 
Address at the United Jewish Appeal (Apr. 15, 1947), available at 
http://www.roberthjackson.org/the-man/speeches-articles/speeches/speeches-by-
robert-h-jackson/address-at-the-united-jewish-appeal/. 
 34. 325 U.S. 1, 48 (1945) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Eugene 
C. Gerhart, A Decade of Mr. Justice Jackson, 28 N.Y.U. L. REV. 927, 948 (1958).  
 35. 323 U.S. 214, 248 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 36. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
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that a mandatory flag salute requirement violated the 
rights of Jehovah‟s Witness children who were expelled 
from school when, for religious reasons, they refused to 
salute the flag.37 Barnette reversed a 1940 ruling in which 
Justice Felix Frankfurter had argued that “national unity is 
the basis of national security,” and it was constitutional to 
require the flag salute as a means of fostering that unity.38  
Jackson in Barnette saw it differently. “Struggles to coerce 
uniformity of sentiment in support of some end thought 
essential to their time and country have been waged by 
many good as well as by evil men,” he wrote for the Court.39 
But: 
Ultimate futility of such attempts to compel coherence is the 
lesson of every such effort from the Roman drive to stamp out 
Christianity as a disturber of its pagan unity, the Inquisition, as a 
means to religious and dynastic unity, the Siberian exiles as a 
means to Russian unity, down to the fast failing efforts of our 
present totalitarian enemies. Those who begin coercive 
elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating 
dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the 
unanimity of the graveyard.
40
   
Cold War-era cases would show that Jackson‟s tolerance 
of dissenting speech was limited, however. In 1949, he 
dissented in a landmark free speech case, Terminiello v. 
Chicago, arguing that dangerous speech should be 
controlled, for “if the Court [did] not temper its doctrinaire 
logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the 
constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.”41 He was 
especially unsympathetic to the Communist Party, viewing 
  
 37. Id. at 642.  
 38. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 595, 599-600 (1940). 
 39. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 640.  
 40. Id. at 641.  
 41. 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). In Terminiello, the Court 
struck down the conviction of a priest whose vitriolic speech, which incited a 
crowd, led to his arrest for breach of the peace. Justice William O. Douglas 
wrote for the majority that “a function of free speech under our system is to 
invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a 
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even 
stirs people to anger.” Id. at 4 (majority opinion). 
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it as a “conspiratorial and revolutionary junta, organized to 
reach ends and to use methods which are incompatible with 
our constitutional system.”42  
Jackson sided with the majority in the prosecution of 
Communist Party members in Dennis v. United States; 
however, in his concurrence, Jackson did not apply the 
Court‟s prevailing First Amendment doctrine.43 Instead, he 
argued that the defendants were not entitled to it. Jackson 
devoted much of his concurrence to a description of the 
methods of communists, drawing lessons from recent 
experience, including the 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia, 
where, he wrote, “the Communist Party during its 
preparatory stage claimed and received protection for its 
freedoms of speech, press, and assembly.”44 The 
international Communist movement, Jackson argued, was 
“able only to harass our own country. But it has seized 
control of a dozen other countries.”45  
The Court majority held that the prosecution was 
lawful, purporting to apply the “clear and present danger” 
test under the First Amendment.46 For Jackson, however, 
the “clear and present danger” test had been developed for a 
different era:  
When the issue is criminality of a hot-headed speech on a street 
corner, or circulation of a few incendiary pamphlets, or parading 
by some zealots behind a red flag, or refusal of a handful of school 
children to salute our flag, it is not beyond the capacity of the 
judicial process to gather, comprehend, and weigh the necessary 
materials for decision whether it is a clear and present danger of 
substantive evil or a harmless letting off of steam.
47
 
But the doctrine should not apply to communists, “a 
well-organized, nation-wide conspiracy,” he wrote, “[u]nless 
we are to hold our Government captive in a judge-made 
  
 42. Am. Commc'ns Ass'n v. Douds, 339 US 382, 424 (1950); Gerhart, supra 
note 34, at 966. 
 43. 341 U.S. 494, 567-70 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 44. Id. at 566.  
 45. Id. at 563.  
 46. See id. at 515 (majority opinion). 
 47. Id. at 568 (Jackson, J., concurring).  
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verbal trap.”48 In rejecting the claims of the Dennis 
defendants, Jackson placed most of his attention not on the 
facts in evidence, but on what he knew and believed about 
communism in the world. “The Communist Party 
realistically is a state within a state, an authoritarian 
dictatorship within a republic,” he wrote.49 “It demands 
these freedoms not for its members, but for the organized 
party. It denies to its own members at the same time the 
freedom to dissent, to debate, to deviate from the party line, 
and enforces its authoritarian rule by crude purges, if 
nothing more violent.”50 In contrast to Jackson‟s concerns 
about dangers posed by communism, Justice Douglas 
argued in dissent that the Communist Party had no power 
in the United States because their ideas had been rejected.51 
Protecting rights safeguarded democracy, Jackson had 
argued in the flag salute case, but in Dennis, rights seemed 
to threaten free government. In arguing that the security 
threat counseled departure from the Court‟s otherwise 
applicable doctrine, Jackson‟s argument was triggered by 
his assessment of the nature of the threat—a national 
security judgment courts are usually reluctant to engage in. 
The idea that communists were a singular threat, and 
so were outside the law, mattered in other cases, including 
American Communications Ass’n v. Douds, which upheld 
the requirement that labor leaders file an affidavit that they 
were not communists before a union could benefit from the 
protection of federal labor law.52 Jackson spent much of his 
lengthy concurrence and dissent discussing the nature of 
the Communist Party, to support his argument that 
“Congress reasonably could have concluded that the 
Communist Party is something different in fact from any 
other substantial party we have known, and hence may 
constitutionally be treated as something different in law.”53 
  
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 577. 
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. at  584-85 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  
 52. 339 U.S. 382, 414-16 (1950).  
 53. Id. at 423 (Jackson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (footnote 
omitted).  
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Again, existing principles should not be applied to this 
dangerous group. Jackson‟s analysis of communism was so 
resonant that it was reprinted in Harper’s Magazine.54 
Jackson‟s views about communism would carry through 
to cases outside of criminal prosecution and labor law, 
including a case in which important human rights were at 
stake. In Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, Jackson wrote the 
majority opinion upholding the deportation of three resident 
aliens who arrived in the United States as children, and 
later joined the Communist Party.55 The power to deport 
was greatest in war, Jackson wrote, but the deportation 
power was also important during an ambiguous era, like the 
Cold War, since “Congressional apprehension of foreign or 
internal dangers short of war may lead to its use.”56 The 
Cold War, for Jackson, was “short of war,” but examples 
related to military conflict informed the opinion. “[T]he Due 
Process Clause does not shield the citizen from conscription 
and the consequent calamity of being separated from family, 
friends, home and business while he is transported to 
foreign lands to stem the tide of Communism,” Jackson 
wrote, presumably alluding to the reinstatement of the 
draft in 1948.57 “If Communist aggression creates such 
hardships for loyal citizens, it is hard to find justification for 
holding that the Constitution requires that its hardships 
must be spared the Communist alien.”58 It seemed that this 
quasi-war had made communists a quasi-enemy. 
Jackson‟s vision of human rights had been crafted in an 
era when many European Jews became stateless in their 
flight from the Holocaust, so he was attuned to the great 
human impact of the deportation power.59 Still, “[w]e think 
  
 54. Robert H. Jackson, The Communists in America, HARPER‟S MAG., Sept. 
1950, at 21, available at http://www.roberthjackson.org/files/thecenter/files/ 
bibliography/1950s/the-communists-in-america.pdf. 
 55. 342 U.S. 580, 581, 596 (1952). 
 56. Id. at 587.  
 57. Id. at 591; see HOGAN, supra note 17, at 154-56. 
 58. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 591. 
 59. See EUGENE C. GERHART, ROBERT H. JACKSON: COUNTRY LAWYER, SUPREME 
COURT JUSTICE, AMERICA'S ADVOCATE 307-406 (2003). 
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that, in the present state of the world, it would be rash and 
irresponsible to reinterpret our fundamental law to deny or 
qualify the Government‟s power of deportation,” he wrote.60 
“However desirable world-wide amelioration of the lot of 
aliens, we think it is peculiarly a subject for international 
diplomacy.”61 Reform in this area must come from the 
President and Congress, not from the courts. 
For Jackson, rights in these cases did not turn on 
whether the nation was in wartime or peacetime, but on the 
nature of the threat. He argued that the political branches 
were better at judging the proper response to difficult 
national security problems, but he nevertheless rested his 
opinions on his own national security analysis, rather than 
simple deference.  
There were limits to Jackson‟s willingness to uphold 
actions against noncitizens thought to be security risks, 
however. In Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, the 
Court upheld the exclusion of a resident alien who had gone 
overseas to visit his ailing mother.62 When he tried to 
return, he was barred from entering the United States on 
security grounds.63 Because no other country would admit 
him, Mezei was held indefinitely at Ellis Island.64 The 
government refused to reveal the evidence supporting 
Mezei‟s exclusion because its disclosure “would be 
prejudicial to the public interest.”65 
Jackson was outraged. Because Mezei had no right to 
enter the United States, did it follow that “he has no rights 
at all?” Jackson asked.66 The government argued that Mezei 
was free to leave at any time, and that Ellis Island was 
  
 60. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 591. 
 61. Id. 
 62. 345 U.S. 206, 207-08, 216 (1953). See generally Charles D. Weisselberg, 
The Exclusion and Detention of Aliens: Lessons from the Lives of Ellen Knauff 
and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1995). 
 63. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 208.  
 64. Id. at 209. 
 65. Id. at 208. 
 66. Id. at 226 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
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simply his “refuge.”67 “That might mean freedom,” Jackson 
wrote, “if only he were an amphibian! Realistically, this 
man is incarcerated by a combination of forces which keep 
him as effectually as a prison.”68   
Jackson was also sympathetic in the 1950 case of Ellen 
Knauff, a “war bride” who was excluded from the United 
States without a hearing for national security reasons, an 
outcome Jackson found to be “brutal.”69  He wrote in dissent 
that “[t]he plea that evidence of guilt must be secret is 
abhorrent to free men, because it provides a cloak for the 
malevolent, the misinformed, the meddlesome, and the 
corrupt to play the role of informer undetected and 
uncorrected.”70  Knauff faced separation from her husband, 
but Harisiades had also involved the separation of 
families.71  It seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that the 
weight given by Jackson to the government‟s national 
security claims turned at least in part on his sympathies for 
the parties. 
B.  Presidential War Power 
If the communist cases show Jackson‟s thinking about 
national security, cases about war powers tell us more about 
how he thought about war and external threats themselves. 
Jackson concurred in Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., a case 
that upheld a rent-control law based on Congress‟s war 
powers, even though it was passed in 1947.72 Jackson agreed 
with the outcome, but he felt the need to “utter more 
explicit misgivings about war powers than the Court has 
done” because of the government‟s arguments in the case.73 
The Justice Department had offered no basis for the 
  
 67. Id. at 220. 
 68. Id.  
 69. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 550 (1950) 
(Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 70. Id. at 550. 
 71. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 581.  
 72. 333 U.S. 138, 144-46 (1948). 
 73. Id. at 146 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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statute‟s constitutionality other than the “vague, undefined 
and undefinable „war power.‟”74 He wrote:  
[T]his power is the most dangerous one to free government in the 
whole catalogue of powers. It usually is invoked in haste and 
excitement when calm legislative consideration of constitutional 
limitation is difficult. It is executed in a time of patriotic fervor 
that makes moderation unpopular. And, worst of all, it is 
interpreted by judges under the influence of the same passions 
and pressures. Always, as in this case, the Government urges 
hasty decision to forestall some emergency or serve some purpose, 
and pleads that paralysis will result if its claims to power are 
denied or their confirmation delayed.
75
 
If the war power could be invoked simply because the 
effects of the war lingered, then the war power would be 
“permanent—as permanent as the war debts.”76 The reason 
Jackson thought the war power applied to a 1947 law was 
not because of the continuing effects of a war that had 
ended, but instead due to the continuance of war itself. “We 
have armies abroad exercising our war power and have 
made no peace terms with our allies, not to mention our 
principal enemies.”77 In fact, the formal ending of hostilities 
with Germany and Japan would not come until 1951 and 
1952, respectively.78 
Jackson‟s tremendously influential concurrence in the 
Steel Seizure case is his most well-remembered analysis of 
presidential power.79 This 1952 case, in which the Court 
struck down President Truman‟s effort to seize steel mills to 
avert a strike, is remembered by constitutional scholars as a 
case about presidential power during wartime.80 The 
ambiguities of the Cold War era might, at first glance, be 
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brushed aside, since the case dealt squarely with President 
Truman‟s power during the Korean War, when American 
troops were in active combat, and steel was necessary for 
the production of war materiel.81  
Jackson‟s concurrence famously categorizes the scope of 
presidential power based on whether or not the president is 
acting pursuant to, or against, authorization from 
Congress.82 But Jackson goes beyond this topic in this 
important case. He does not set the case in the context of a 
“wartime,” but instead, remarks on the slipperiness of the 
category, so that presidential war power did not appear to 
have a firm foundation. “Loose and irresponsible use of 
adjectives colors all non-legal and much legal discussion of 
presidential powers,” he wrote.83 “„Inherent‟ powers, 
„implied‟ powers, „incidental‟ powers, „plenary‟ powers, „war‟ 
powers and „emergency‟ powers are used, often 
interchangeably and without fixed or ascertainable 
meanings.”84  
Jackson warned that a president cannot have the power 
to define an era as a war, thereby triggering his own war 
powers.85 He did not find it “necessary or appropriate” to 
determine the legal status of “the Korean enterprise.”86 
Congress retained the power to declare war—and they had 
not used it. In Korea, the President had acted without 
Congress, thereby seeming to “invest[ ] himself with „war 
powers.‟”87 
[N]o doctrine that the Court could promulgate would seem to me 
more sinister and alarming than that a President whose conduct 
of foreign affairs is so largely uncontrolled, and often even is 
unknown, can vastly enlarge his mastery over the internal affairs 
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of the country by his own commitment of the Nation‟s armed forces 
to some foreign venture.
88
 
Jackson himself had argued that President Roosevelt 
could draw upon the Commander-in-Chief power long before 
Congress declared war during World War II.89 He thought 
that the Court should not limit this power. It deserved “the 
widest latitude of interpretation . . . at least when turned 
against the outside world for the security of our society.”90 It 
was the internal use of these powers in a labor dispute that 
troubled Jackson. We did not have a “militaristic system” of 
government, but a “constitutional Republic.”91 The purpose 
of placing the presidency and the commander-in-chief in one 
person “was to insure that the civilian would control the 
military, not to enable the military to subordinate the 
presidential office. No penance would ever expiate the sin 
against free government of holding that a President can 
escape control of executive powers by law through assuming 
his military role.”92 The reliance on emergency power by 
European governments during World War II showed that 
“emergency powers are consistent with free government 
only when their control is lodged elsewhere than in the 
Executive who exercises them.”93 
If Jackson‟s anti-communist opinions seem tied within 
the fears of his era, it is the Steel Seizure concurrence that 
helps us to look forward. His most important critique was 
that the President had himself declared an era a wartime, 
and then argued that this self-declared wartime was the 
occasion for the expansion of his own powers. Jackson called 
Korea a “foreign venture,” not a de jure war, but perhaps a 
de facto war.94 When it came to the powers of war, he argued 
that in our system of government they must be reined in by 
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law, and not invoked by the president on his own and 
without political restraints. 
Jackson‟s concern in the Steel Seizure case, that a 
president should not go to war without Congress, thereby 
generating his own war powers, would become more 
important in later years. War would not be formally 
declared again for the rest of the twentieth century, and yet 
war powers would be drawn upon repeatedly in more 
occasions like Korea.95  
And so Jackson‟s most important point in the Steel 
Seizure case is not the analysis for which his opinion is 
usually cited. The President had himself declared an era a 
wartime, Jackson argued, and then this self-declared 
wartime was used as the occasion for the expansion of his 
own powers.96 As we can see from the Steel Seizure case, this 
problem existed long before a President would declare war 
on terrorism. Later Presidents would also announce a 
wartime and commit American troops, and thereby would 
create the occasion for the invocation of their own war 
powers.97  
III. RUMORS OF WAR 
When Robert Jackson returned to Buffalo to deliver the 
first Mitchell Lecture on May 9, 1951, he spoke of an altered 
world.98 This time his topic was “Wartime Security and 
Liberty Under Law,” but his title belied the ambiguity of the 
era.99 His lecture drew from his opinions of the previous few 
years, when he so often described the era in more fluid 
terms.100 
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Jackson had once thought of 1946 as an ending to 
warfare, but this new era had not brought peacetime. 
Instead, he told the audience at Buffalo, “[t]he best that we 
can now hope for seems to be a prolonged period of 
international tension and rumors of war, with war itself as 
the ever threatening alternative.”101 In this environment, 
“we can no longer take either security or liberty for 
granted.”102  
He seemed to agree with the direction American 
national security policy had taken, that protection from 
global threats came not from international law but from 
American power.103 “For security against foreign attack we 
must look to the professions which manage our armed forces 
and to the economy of the country that sustains them.”104 
But Jackson remained hopeful about the status of the 
United States in this new world order. “I see not the 
slightest probability in the foreseeable future that any 
conqueror can impose oppression upon us,” he told his 
audience.105 Instead, “the dangers to our liberties which I 
would discuss with you are those that we created among 
ourselves.”106 
Could he know whether his most important life‟s work, 
his efforts at Nuremberg, were “but a flash of light in an 
otherwise dark century, or . . . the harbinger of a dawn”?107 
The world he had imagined at Nuremberg, in which peace 
would follow war, had slipped away. The United Nations 
had not become a powerful arena for global law 
enforcement, but instead a site of Cold War politics.108 And 
it was hard to imagine legal institutions restraining warfare 
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when war and peace had melted together into an unsettling 
and ambiguous era.  
Americans were “troubled, disillusioned and confused,” 
he said in late January, 1954, in the last year of his life.109 
American ideals seemed not to have taken hold in the 
world, but were in retreat. And the nation had been drawn 
into an arms race, “a policy of accumulating more military, 
air and naval force than the Communists can muster.”110 Yet 
he continued to believe that military force alone would not 
determine the course of history, for the Cold War was 
“largely a war of ideas, a struggle for the minds of men.”111  
In terms of his own ideas, Jackson‟s Cold War era 
jurisprudence will not warm the hearts of contemporary 
civil libertarians. But in an era when war powers seem 
immune to political restraints, Jackson‟s ideas about law 
and power, the core lesson of Nuremberg, remains 
important: the idea that the forces of war and destruction 
can be constrained by a collective will embodied in law. This 
was inscribed into his vision at Nuremberg. And when it 
came to presidential war power, this remained for Jackson 
an article of faith: “With all its defects, delays and 
inconveniences,” he wrote in the Steel Seizure case, humans 
“have discovered no technique for long preserving free 
government except that the Executive be under the law, and 
that the law be made by parliamentary deliberations.”112 
And it was his role, and that of his colleagues on the bench, 
to enforce this principle. “Such institutions may be destined 
to pass away. But it is the duty of the Court to be last, not 
first, to give them up.”113 
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